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Abstract: This article focuses ŽŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ:ŽŚŶ& ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨƚhe Treasury, C. 
Douglas Dillon and contends that he played an important part in sustaining the political 
cooperation that underpinned the Bretton-Woods system during one of its first crisis points. 
Rather than focus solely on structural, economic trends, the article suggests that individual 
actors mattered as well. As a bipartisan figure that was well-regarded in Europe, Dillon was 
able to act effectively as an envoy to the private sector, principally Wall Street, and to 
France, which both threatened the stability of the dollar. The article ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛrole in 
ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐin a more conservative direction than his successor, 
Lyndon B. Johnson, and in his external efforts to garner support for the Democratic 
administration. 
 
Keywords: C. Douglas Dillon, John F. Kennedy, Robert Roosa, Bretton-Woods, balance of 
payments 
 
The Bretton-Woods system, the post-war economic system premised on dollar 
convertibility, was both an economic arrangement and a political construct. Almost from the 
outset, the system strained. It nevertheless survived, as Barry Eichengreen has suggested, 
through an  ‘interlocking web of political and economic bargains ?.2 This article focuses on the 
John F. Kennedy administration and the transition to the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, 
a time when the system faced its first crisis.3 Rather than focus on the economic issues 
during that period, as many have already done, the article focuses on individuals principally 
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the Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon and his role in garnering the political will that 
was necessary to sustain the system. Dillon exerted influence directly by liaising with key 
stakeholders in domestic and European financial circles and indirectly by winning over 
Kennedy to his economic views. Dillon moved Kennedy towards a more fiscally conservative 
position than his successor would later ƚĂŬĞ ?/ŶƚƵƌŶ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐŬĞǇƚŽƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂůůŝĞƐũƵƐƚĂƐŚŝƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌ ?Ɛ
perceived fiscal irresponsibility had the opposite effect. Unlike diplomatic historians who 
have largely focused their attention on inter-state relations, this article suggests that private 
actors were also important.4 Dillon and his Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs Robert 
Roosa were able to leverage their personal networks in European and US financial circles in 
order to secure the help of internationalist businessmen, most notably David Rockefeller, to 
great effect.  
By focusing on the bilateral relations between Treasury officials and their 
counterparts in Europe as well as their contacts in the private sector, the article provides a 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůĞŶƐƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝĐŚĞŶŐƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ďĂƌŐĂŝŶƐ ? ?/ŶƐŽĚŽŝŶŐ ?ŝƚƐŚĞĚƐůŝŐŚƚŽŶ
ƚŚĞƚŝŵŝŶŐŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽŶƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂtional 
ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶĐĞZŽďĞƌƚZŽŽƐĂ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƐŚĂǀĞǇĞƚƚŽďĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞĚďǇ
the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the article suggests that the topic of cooperation 
during the Bretton-Woods era remains a ripe area for research. Using newly-available 
ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĞĨƵůůƐĞƚŽĨŽƵŐůĂƐŝůůŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉĂƉĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
memoranda of his telephone conversations) and files from the Rockefeller archives, the 
article sheds additional light on ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝn sustaining the Bretton 
Woods system during tumultuous years. 
To date, the literature on cooperation during the Bretton-Woods era has focused 
relatively more on inter-state relations and especially on Franco-American relations. Most 
historians have suggesƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĞŶĐŚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐĂůǀŽĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĚŽůůĂƌ
ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶ ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůďŝĂƐ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ his Anglo-Saxon 
rivals.5 &ŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽŶƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌŚĂĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŽŽƚƐ PĂƐ&ƌĂŶŬŽƐƚŝŐůŝŽůĂ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐŽǀĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝƐƐƵĞƐƐƉŝůůĞĚŽǀĞƌŝŶƚŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?6 
In reality, political and economic realities were indistinguishable. While these historians are 
correct in seeing escalation in Vietnam as an important trigger in de GauůůĞ ?ƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽŶ
US leadership, the problem was not the war itself but rather the economic implications of 
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the war ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂƐǇŵƉƚŽŵŽĨWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ lack of economic 
discipline.7 Ignoring ŝůůŽŶĂŶĚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞDĐEĂŵĂƌĂ ?ƐǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ
demonstrated a largesse towards allies that they had not seen with Kennedy.8  
Finally, some historians have spoken about the salience of economic ideas and about 
the change in power balance within the French administration to explain the change in 
transatlantic cooperation on monetary issues in the Johnson administration. For them, the 
ƌŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚ:ĂĐƋƵĞƐZƵĞĨĨ ?ƐĂŶĚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽƵǀĞĚĞDƵƌǀŝůůĞ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶ
de Gaulle over more Atlanticist officials such as Wilfrid Baumgmartner and his successor as 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?sĂůĠƌǇ'ŝƐĐĂƌĚĚ ?ƐƚĂŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐĂsignificant variable.9 In fact, as John 
Odell has shown, a shift in power occurred ŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐǁĞůů ?ǁŝƚŚŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ
relegation from a preeminent to a secondary role in the transition from Kennedy to Johnson 
ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇǁŝƚŚŚŝƐĂŶĚZŽŽƐĂ ?ƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ,ĞŶƌǇ&ŽǁůĞƌĂŶĚ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬĞŵŝŶŐ
respectively. Mirroring explanations for the French shift, Odell claims that the change in 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůǁĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƐŝŐŶĂůůĞĚƚŚĂƚZŽďĞƌƚdƌŝĨĨŝŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƚƚŽŶ
tŽŽĚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůƚŚĂŶŝůůŽŶĂŶĚZŽŽƐĂ ?Ɛ ?ǁĞƌĞŽŶƚŚĞĂƐĐĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?10
dŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞďƵŝůĚƐŽŶKĚĞůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŚĞƌĞũĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶmonetary 
ƉŽůŝĐǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞǁĞƌĞ ‘ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĂďůĞĂƐĂŶĂĐƋƵŝĞƐĐĞŶĐĞƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐĂƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐďǇŝŵƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ŽƌďǇ
domestic pressures. As he does, the research here suggests that agents, President Kennedy, 
Dillon and Roosa, were important. Whereas for Odell agents were only important insofar as 
they carried with them ideas on reforming the international monetary system, here the 
suggestion is made that actors were important in their own right as stabilizing forces. 
^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞĂĚĚƐƚŽƌŝŶDĂŚĂŶĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ'ĂǀŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ
was remarkably cooperative on economic issues and was not a knee-jerk challenger to US 
hegemony.11 /ƚĂĚĚƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽƚŚĞůŝƐƚŽĨ ‘ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƌƐ ? ?dŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞŵĂŬĞƐĂĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĞƉ
towards filling a gap in the existing literature on the role of private actors during this period. 
dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĚĞĂƌƚŚŽĨǁŽƌŬƐŽŶƚŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ
community although many in the administration were more concerned about Wall Street 
than they were about European allies.12  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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Dillon at the Treasury Department 
ŝůůŽŶǁĂƐĂƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐĐŚŽŝĐĞĂƐ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?,ĞďĞŐĂŶŚŝƐĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƚŚŝƐĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
investment bank Dillon, Read & Co. and only reluctantly took on its Chairmanship after 
wartime service.13 The bank was at the centre of the revolving door between government 
and business: its alumni included Paul Nitze and the first US Secretary of Defense James 
Forrestal. Instead of banking however, Dillon preferred a career in government and swiftly 
left banking to join the Eisenhower administration where he served as Ambassador to 
France and then Undersecretary of State for Economic affairs. In the latter role, ŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ
ǀŝĞǁƐĞĐŚŽĞĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ŚĞďĞĐĂŵĞĂŶĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĨŽƌĂ
 ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŝĚ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ůĞƐƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂƌĞĂƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚŝŶƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ? ?14 Despite 
rhetorical similarities with the Democrat candidate however, Dillon was a staunch 
Republican. He had campaigned for Republican presidential candidates in each election 
since 1948 and had been a major donor to the Richard Nixon campaign.15  
DillŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚƵƉďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂŶĚĐĂƌĞĞƌŐĂǀĞŚŝŵĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĂƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶ
business around the world. In his oral histories for the Kennedy Presidential Library, Dillon 
recounted how he had known the Chairman of the Federal Reserve William McChesney 
MaƌƚŝŶ ‘ĨŽƌƐŽŵĞ25 years, long before he ever caŵĞƚŽǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŚŽǁƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽůƵŵŶŝƐƚ:ŽƐĞƉŚůƐŽƉǁĂƐĂŶ ‘ŽůĚĨƌŝĞŶĚŽĨŵŝŶĞŝŶďŽĂƌĚŝŶŐƐĐŚŽŽůĂŶĚĐŽůůĞŐĞ ?
 ?ĂƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌďƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?ŚŽǁ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌtŝůůŝĂŵ&ƵůďƌŝŐŚƚǁĂƐĂ ‘ǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?
and how he had maintained cordial relations with de Gaulle during ƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ wilderness 
years.16 This bipartisan network was a key selling point for his candidacy at the head of the 
Treasury. 
 In appointing Dillon to the position, Kennedy insisted that his choice was without 
political calculations. In their first joint press conference, the President-elect explained that 
ĨŽƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŽƵĐŚĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ‘/ŚĂǀĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ
to secure the best people available in the United States regardless of their party  W men who 
ĂƌĞƵŶŝƚĞĚďǇĂĐŽŵŵŽŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐĞĞ ? Q ?ŽƵƌƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ? ?ŝůůŽŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
how  ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨĨŝƐĐĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝƐĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƵƌ
nationĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂŶĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞĂĚĚĞ  ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ
ĨƌĞĞǁŽƌůĚŝƐƚŝĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŝƐĐĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?
tŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚŚŽǁŚĞĨĞůƚĂďŽƵƚũŽŝŶŝŶŐĂ ‘ĐĂďŝŶĞƚĨƵůůŽĨĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ? ?Dillon laughed the 
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ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨĨ ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ? ‘/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇŽŶĞ ?Dƌ ?DĐEĂŵĂƌĂŝƐǁŝƚŚŵĞŝŶƚŚĂƚ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?17 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝůůŽŶĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶ ‘ĨŝƐĐĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞƐƐ
conference was a not so subtle indication that actually, Dillon was a political appointment 
designed specifically to reassure Republicans and Allies that their fears of a profligate 
Democrat president were unfounded. During the election, the price of gold had shot up 
against worries that Kennedy might devalue. In a series of letters to then-Senator Kennedy, 
the economist John Kenneth Galbraith warned that for the first year since the creation of 
the Bretton-tŽŽĚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐůĂŝŵƐŽŶĚŽůůĂƌƐŶŽǁĞǆĐĞĞĚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŐŽůĚ
reserves and that the incoming President needed to send a clear message to actors that 
might provoke a run on the dollar.18 Kennedy did so in a speech delivered in Philadelphia in 
October 1960.  
Also, his transition team, which included Paul Nitze, recommended a Treasury 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ‘ǁŚŽĞŶũŽǇƐŚŝŐŚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚ
ideally had previous experience in State. Richard Neustadt narrowed the candidates down 
the list to Robert Lovett, John McCloy and Dillon. He admitted that the administration would 
proďĂďůǇĞŶĚƵƉǁŝƚŚĂZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐǇŵďŽůŝƐŵƐŽĨďŝƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶƐŚŝƉ
ĂŶĚĨŝƐĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƌŽůůĞĚŝŶƚŽŽŶĞ ? ?19 A separate McKinsey study agreed. It explained 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƌŽůĞǁĂƐƚŽďĞĂƐƉŽŬĞƐƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŽŽŶŐƌĞƐƐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐial interests, 
which tended to be overwhelmingly Republican.20 
The bipartisan and reassuring choice of Dillon was not without its detractors.21 While 
'ĂůďƌĂŝƚŚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ‘ĞƵƉŚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ? ?ĂŶĚŝůůŽŶ ?ƐŽůĚĨƌŝĞŶĚ:ŽĞůƐŽƉ ‘ĞƋƵĂůůǇ
ŝŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĞĚ ?about Dillon, others were concerned.22 Robert Kennedy speculated that he 
could later resign loudly and embarrass the administration.23 Arthur Schlesinger worried 
ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞůŝŬĞŝůůŽŶǁŽƵůĚƐĐƵƚƚůĞůŝďĞƌĂůĚƌĞĂŵƐ ?,ĞǁƌŽƚĞ ? ‘dŚĞŐŽůĚĐƌŝƐŝƐŵĂŬĞƐ
Treasury especially critical, since the orthodox answer would be to reduce public spending 
ĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƌĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĂůůŝůůŽŶ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂů
ŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?24 Senator Albert Gore, who had campaigned with Kennedy against 
EiƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ǁĂƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĨƵƌŝŽƵƐ ?25  ‘^ƵĐŚĂŶ
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŚĞǁĂƌŶĞĚ ? ‘ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƐŝŐŶĂůƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŐŝ ĞŶƵƉƚŚĞŐŽĂůƐŽĨĂƚƌƵůǇ
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?26 'ŽƌĞĂůƐŽǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŝůůŽŶǁŽƵůĚƐŬĞǁƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
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pŽůŝĐǇ ?ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ultra-conservative policy wrapped up with pseudonyms and labels to 
ŵĂŬĞŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĂƐůŝďĞƌĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?27 
 To some extent, Gore was correct. Much as Dillon played up his conversion to 




particularly close.28 ƐŶĞǁƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŶŽƚĞĚ ?ƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŝůůŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƐǁĞƌĞĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?Ă ‘ďŝŐĂŶĚďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?
banker-oriented and debt conscioƵƐ ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŝƚĂůƐŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝůůŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƚĂŬĞ
on the problems confronting the United States, a view he shared with the President.29 
 As Galbraith had intimated during the campaign, the start of the Kennedy 
administration coincided with the first period after the war during which the United States 
felt a tension between its domestic ambitions and its global responsibilities. Despite the 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďĞƐƚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐto encourage trade, overseas operations and foreign access to 
American capital produced a persistent balance of payments deficit. This was a result of 
government actions and of private capital outflows. Yet in the face of a lagging domestic 
economy, the administration could not increase interest rates. Robert Triffin, the Yale 
economist, gave his name to this core dilemma: to resolve the balance of payments, the 
United States should have increased interest rates but as a reserve currency, it could not do 
this without also choking off liquidity that was necessary for growth at home and in allied 
economies in the absence of alternative capital markets abroad. 
 As a result, Dillon and Roosa went to work with Allies on a number of short-term 
steps alongside secret longer-ƚĞƌŵƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐ
alternatives to the dollar-gold peg.30 Roosa played a central part in flagship steps, including 
in the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ZŽŽƐĂďŽŶĚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŝŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ
of a London gold pool that was designed to buffer against changes in the price of gold, and 
ŝŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ/D& ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?31 In addition, Dillon pressured other 
government departments  W chiefly the Defense Department - to reduce overseas outlays 
ĂŶĚƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞůůŝĞƐƚŽ ‘ŽĨĨƐĞƚ ?ĚŽůůĂƌĐŽƐƚƐŽĨh^ŽƉĞƌations. He became the public face of 
the Interest Equalization Tax (IET), which de facto taxed foreign access to US capital by 
ƚĂǆŝŶŐh^ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ ?ƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚdƌŝĨĨŝŶ ?ĚĞƌŝĚĞĚ
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these as mere  ‘ƉĂůůŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐďƵt nevertheless subsequently accepted that they 
 ‘ƉŽƐƚƉŽŶĞĚƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?ŽĨƌĞĐŬŽŶŝŶŐ ?ůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶ/ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?32 
 /ŶŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛcorrespondence with President Kennedy, what is remarkable is how much 
of this cooperation remained secret to even senior members of the administration and how 
many internal debates Dillon won. He overruled the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and 
other economic experts on virtually all main economic points of contention, including the 
timing and pace of the tax cut bill and in delaying public works spending. During a key 
Cabinet-wide discussion on the balance of payments in September 1963, Dillon and 
Galbraith dominated the discussion.33 Throughout this period, where the more academic 
economists in the CEA recommended a wholesale reform of the Bretton-Woods system, 
Dillon argued that preserving confidence was critical, that reform would work only after the 
United States had begun to tackle its balance of payments problems. In July 1961, for 
instance, Triffin suggested creating a  ‘super-central bank for creating international 
ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ ? ?34 ŝůůŽŶĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚƚŚŝƐŝĚĞĂ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘our feelings were based on 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝƚǇ ? ?35 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ǁŚĞŶdƌŝĨĨŝŶ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞĨƌŽŵzĂůĞ ?:ĂŵĞƐdŽďŝŶǁŚŽǁĂƐŶŽǁŝŶƚŚĞ
 ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂ ‘ĨůŽĂƚŝŶŐĚŽůůĂƌĨƌĞĞŽĨŐŽůĚ ? ?ŝƚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĚůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?36  
 Similarly, Dillon frequently overruled the State Department despite saying that his 
experiences there as Undersecretary under the economic stringency of the Eisenhower 
administration had made him very conscious of departmental prerogatives.37 When Walt 
Rostow recommended that Kennedy devalue and expressed anger at plans to withdraw 
ƚƌŽŽƉƐĨƌŽŵƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŝůůŽŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ ? ‘dŚŝƐphilosophy is the natural reaction of those 
who find their preferred policies threatenĞĚďǇďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ? ?38 But 
Dillon had powerful allies as he pushed for troop reductions and other policies aimed at 
redressing the balance of payments deficit.  They included McNamara and Galbraith. 
ƌƵƐŚŝŶŐĂƐŝĚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ‘ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐ ? ?DĐEĂŵĂƌĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŽŝůůŽŶ ? ‘tĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ
try to be too fancy with the Germans and the French and pretend that our balance of 
ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽĂƚĂůůǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ ? ?39 Similarly, in pushing for offset 
agreements, Dillon and McNamara won over Kennedy despite objections from the State 
Department that such agreements might weaken the perceived US commitment to Allies. 
 Dillon was able to overrule the CEA and the State Department by convincing 
President Kennedy that securing business and Allied confidence was of first importance. 
>ŝďĞƌĂůĐƌŝƚŝĐƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ'ŽƌĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂŶŐĞƌĂƚƚŚŝƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
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community, both international and national, in order to bolster and preserve the confidence 
in the dollar, confidence in tŚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?,ĞĞƋƵĂƚĞĚƚŚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐ
 ‘ŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ
ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ? ?40 <ĞŶŶĞĚǇƉƵďůŝĐůǇĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ?ŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŶŽƚĂďůǇŝŶƚŚĞzĂůĞ
Commencement speech in June 1962.41 zĞƚ ?ŝŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ŚĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚŚŝƐ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
that securing confidence was a sine qua non condition for other domestic economic 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐĂŶĚĨŽƌůůŝĞƐ ?ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 
For Dillon and Roosa, confidence was only possible by  ‘ĂǀŽŝĚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĂŶǇƉƵďůŝĐ
expression of undue concern over the gold situations inasmuch as the concern might in 
ŝƚƐĞůĨƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůĨůŝŐŚƚ ?and, as Gore feared, by demonstrating fiscal prudence.42 Not 
long after the Berlin crisis in September 1961 that had triggered gold hoarding and a further 
ĐƌŝƐŝƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽƵŶĚŝŶKĐƚŽďĞƌ ?ŝůůŽŶǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ P ‘dŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐůŽƐƐ
will depend on how much of their dollar gains foreigners will decide to keep in dollar 
balances instead of requesting gold. This in turn will depend on the general state of 
confidence in our overall financial situation which has clearly declined in recent months. To 
get the trend moving in the right direction again, it is highly important that a strong effort 
ďĞŵĂĚĞƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƚŚŝƐĨŝƐĐĂůǇĞĂƌĂƐůŽǁĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?43 Dillon repeatedly told the 
President that long-term reforms to the international monetary system that might make the 
United States more resilient were only possible by first securing confidence in the 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?,ĞǁƌŽƚĞ ? ‘We have got to get our own 
deficit really well in hand before any of the continental people will be ready for any earth-
ƐŚĂŬŝŶŐŶĞǁƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?44  
In addition, Dillon and Roosa used their networks and clout in the private sector and 
with Europeans to produce secret back channels.45 For Dillon, their secret meetings with 
European central bankers and government officials were Ă ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
relative strength of the dollar. ?46 His correspondence with Kennedy is replete with 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǀĞƌǇƋƵŝĞƚ ?Đontacts.47 Later, Roosa ascribed his own need 
ĨŽƌƐĞĐƌĞĐǇƚŽŚŝƐƚŝŵĞĂƚƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂůZĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚŚĂĚ ‘ůĞĨƚŵĞǁŝƚŚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂƚƌĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
preference for secrecy and aloofness that has necessarily become traditional in that 
ĨƌĂƚĞƌŶŝƚǇ ? ?48 
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However, what is not clear from their correspondence is whether Kennedy was 
predisposed to agree with Dillon in the first place. In his oral history, Dillon argued that 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĐŚŽƐĞŚŝŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂŐƌĞĞĚŽŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?,ĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? ‘,ĞǁĂƐĂĨƌĂŝĚ
that there was a lack of confidence in the US and that nobody knew what the new policies 
would be. He said that I could render substantial assistance because I was known in Europe 
and was known to believe in the maintenance of the value of the dollar and in a sound 
dollar, ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŝŶŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ? ?49 ^ĐŚůĞƐŝŶŐĞƌƐĂǁ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ 
influence in this ? ‘dŚĞĞůĚĞƌ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŚĂĚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐďĞůŝĞĨŝŶƚŚĞŵǇƐƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ
 “confidence ? and used to warn against action or appointments which might impair that 
sacred commodity ? ?ŚĞǁƌŽƚĞ ?DĂŶǇĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐǁĞƌĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚŝĨŶŽƚĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇ
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚůŝŶĞŽŶĨŝƐĐĂůpolicy.50 
By contrast ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌǁĂƐĨĂƌůĞƐƐĨŝƐĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĂůŽof 
ŝŶŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝůůŽŶ ?tŝƚŚŝŶĚĂǇƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƐƐĂƐƐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝůůŽŶǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ
ĂďŽƵƚŵĂƌŬĞƚƚƵƌďƵůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂƌĞĂƐƐƵƌŝŶŐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĨŽƌ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŽ
the nation.51 Johnson used just ten words. Diplomatically, Dillon recaůůĞĚƚŚĂƚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ‘ŚĂĚ
very little interest that I could see, in substance. He may have had it internally, but it never 
ĐĂŵĞŽƵƚ ? ?52 /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞĚĂǇŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨƵŶĞƌĂů ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶƐĞƚĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽŶĞ ?^ĐŚůĞƐŝŶŐĞƌ
ŶŽƚĞĚ P ‘,ĞŚĂƐĂƐƐƵƌĞĚ[Walter] Heller and Galbraith that he is a Roosevelt Democrat, not 
an Eisenhower Democrat; that he always felt Kennedy to be unduly conservative on fiscal 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĞƉůĂŶƐƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĂŶĚĞŶůĂƌŐĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ? ?53 Even as Dillon continued to champion the Kennedy tax cut, which Johnson 
would also speak to in his first speech, he reminded the President that expenditure control 
was crucial to placate conservative and business fears.54 
 The problem too was that Johnson and his new entourage seemed to ad lib on 
ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?/ŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
commitment to keep six divisions in West Germany, Dillon was furious.55 He wrote about 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŵĂƚƚĞƌĨƌŽŵĂďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ?ĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ
 ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨŽƵƌƉŽƐƚƵƌĞŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚĞŶƚƌĂůĂŶŬƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?56 A few months 
ůĂƚĞƌ ?ŝůůŽŶǁŽƌŬĞĚǁŝƚŚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚŝůůDŽǇers to articulate a press line on the 
balance of payments, only to find his advice ignored.57 :ŽŚŶƐŽŶƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇĨŝĞůĚĞĚŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ
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calls who complained that when the President called for a cabinet meeting on economic 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ũƵƐƚĂƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇƐƚƵŶƚ ? ?58  
ŝůůŽŶ ?ƐĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶcontinued to grow into the spring of 1965 when he 
finally left. In early 1965, when the President made a suggestion about devaluation that 
landed in the Wall Street Journal, Dillon seethed:  ‘tĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝs for a year 
and a half; that certainly no suggestion involving a change in the price of gold is acceptable 
ŽƌƉƌŽƉĞƌ ? ?59 :ƵƐƚĚĂǇƐďĞĨŽƌĞĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĞǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ
tŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞƐƚĂĨĨ ? ‘&ŽƌŐŽĚ ?ƐƐĂŬĞƚĞůůĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞŶŽƚƚ ƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? Q ?dĂůŬ
ŵĂŬĞƐĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐǁŽƌƐĞ ? ?60 In conversations with his colleagues, he complained about the 
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƚŚŝŶƐŬŝŶĂŶĚůĂĐŬŽĨĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?/ŶŽŶĞƉŚŽŶĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
DĐ'ĞŽƌŐĞƵŶĚǇƚŽůĚŝůůŽŶŚŽǁ ‘ ?/ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?DĐŽŶĞƐĂŝĚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? Q ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ
ǁĂƐďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇƵƐƵƌƉŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ? W ŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚǁĞŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƐƚĂŶĚƵƉƚŽŚŝŵ ? ?61 But 
without direct access to the President, Dillon was ignored. 
 hůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽŚĞĞĚŝůůŽŶ ?ƐĂĚǀŝĐĞƚŚĂƚŚŝƐpolicies had potentially 
catastrophic economic consequences and that political cooperation from Allies also relied 
on a series of economic understandings that Dillon had carefully negotiated. A deficit was 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞŵ ‘ĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐŝƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐƚĂǇƚŽŽůŽŶŐ ? ?ŚĞǁĂƌŶĞĚ ?62 Whereas Kennedy had 
considered increasing taxes in the wake of the Berlin crisis, Johnson refused to do so as the 
US commitment to South Vietnam began to escalate. Unlike Kennedy, Johnson did not share 
European and conservative concerns about balancing the budget and the potential danger 
ŽĨĞǆƉŽƌƚŝŶŐŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽůĞƐƐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĂĚŽƉƚŽƌĂĚũƵƐƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁƐ ?tŝƚŚŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ
departure from government, Johnson ultimately lost someone who could defend the more 
conservative view and, with him, access to a well-developed network with the same actors 
that might precipitate a run on the dollar, especially in France and the American banking 
community. 
 
French monetary cooperation 
The extensive literature on French monetary cooperation to date has largely focused on a 
philosophical shift within French government about the role of the dollar in the mid-1960s. 
Mahan and Gavin, in particular, have focused on the ascent of Rueff and Prime Minister 
ĞďƌĠ ?ƐĂŶŐĞƌǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ĞĂƐǇŵŽŶĞǇ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĞǆƉŽƌƚŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŽ
international dollar holders.63 tŚŝůĞĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚĞƐĞ
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ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƌŽůĞ
under the Bretton-Woods sǇƐƚĞŵĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?ŐŽůĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ŚĞĂůƐŽ
reflected on the long-standing cooperation that existed. In his speech, the General spoke of 
ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝǀĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐĂŶĚŽĨŽǀĞƌĚƵĞĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚ
be undertakeŶŝŶĂ ‘ƐĞƌĞŶĞ ?ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ?64
Mahan has shown that France was overwhelmingly cooperative in the early part of 
the decade: before 1962, France was one of the few countries that did not convert its dollar 
reserves into gold.65 If anyone, it was Britain that waƐĐŚĂƐƚŝƐĞĚĨŽƌŝƚƐ ‘ƚŽƚĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƚƌĂůĂŶŬĞƌƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ? ?66 Kennedy only began to 
complain about the French on monetary issues in 1963. However, even then, Roosa urged 
ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƚŽƐĞĞŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇƚŚŝŶŬ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŝǀĞŶĞŶŽƵŐŚĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŚŝƐĂůůǇ'ŝƐĐĂƌĚĚ ?ƐƚĂŝŶŐǁŚŽ
ǁĂƐ ‘ďĞŝŶŐŵĂĚĞĂƐĐĂƉĞŐŽĂƚ ? ?67 Despite some tensions, the American and French positions 
ǁĞƌĞŶĞǀĞƌǁŝůĚůǇŽĨĨĚƵƌŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?s time as both sides agreed on the threat that a 
continued balance of payments deficit posed to the international monetary system. 
Moreover, Dillon and Roosa regularly extended diplomatic gestures to de Gaulle and to his 
closest advisors, many of whom were long-time friends. This was no longer true after Roosa 
and Dillon left the Johnson administration, in January and April 1965 respectively. 
Yet, although Dillon and de Gaulle had known each other for some time, whatever 
warmth they might have had evaporated when Dillon came to the Treasury Department. As 
Ambassador to France, Dillon, whose family owned a reputed Bordeaux vineyard, had been 
well-ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĂƵůůŝƐƚƐ ?,ĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĞĚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐǇĞĂƌƐ out of 
government and befriended the then-Senator Debré. Later, as Undersecretary of State, 
Dillon accompanied de Gaulle and his wife for the duration of their trip to the United States 
ŝŶƉƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĂŶŬŝŶŐŚŝŵ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁƌŽƚĞŽĨŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĨƵůŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?
and expressed hiƐ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĞĞŵ ? ?68 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚŵĂŬĞŝůůŽŶŵŽƌĞ
sympathetic to the French President once he was at the Treasury. Even aĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
 ? ? ? ?ƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ŝůůŽŶŵŝŶŝŵŝǌĞĚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐĨůĂƚƚĞƌǇǁŽƵůĚ
placatĞŚŝŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞďĞƐƚƐĞƌǀĞĚŝĨŝƚ ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?Ě ?ŽŶƚŚĞ
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞŝƐƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ? ?69 ŝůůŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚ
experience at the Treasury working with his French counterparts at the Ministry of Finance 
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encouraged his view that de Gaulle was a temporary, and surmountable, obstacle to 
cooperation.  
dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ŝůůŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐƚƐĂƚƚŚĞ
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞǁĂƐĂďůĞƚŽŬĞĞƉZƵĞĨĨ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶĐŚĞĐŬĂŶĚůĂƌŐĞůy dictated the tone 
of Franco-American monetary cooperation. Baumgartner and his successor as Minister of 
Finance, Giscard ensured cooperation and largely bypassed de Gaulle. Dillon addressed both 
ŵĞŶĂƐ ‘ŵǇĚĞĂƌĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂƐĞĐƌĞƚĐŚĂŶŶĞůŽĨ communication with them 
through Ambassador James Gavin.70 As he would in every other period of tension, when de 
Gaulle felt spurned by bilateral talks between UK Prime Minister Macmillan and Kennedy in 
DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?ŝůůŽŶƌƵƐŚĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚŝƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝnvited Baumgartner to spend time with 
him in Washington.71 Despite initial concerns over Giscard, Dillon found him no less 
cooperative. On his visits to Paris, on the margins of OECD, IMF or NATO meetings, he 
dedicated an unusual amount of time to Giscard.72 
 Until 1963, the Finance Ministry actively kept de Gaulle in the dark over international 
monetary affairs. In the lead-ƵƉƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚƚŽ&ƌĂŶĐĞŝŶDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƵŵŐĂƌƚŶĞƌĂŶĚ
ŝůůŽŶĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĞǆƉerts of our two 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁĂƐũƵƐƚ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĂǁĂƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?73 The Bank 
of France cooperated in hiding relevant information from the President. In one secret 
meeting with Dillon in May 1962, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, Pierre Calvet, 
ƚŽůĚŝůůŽŶƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽƚǁĞůůĂǁĂƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚĂƚŚŝƌĚŽĨŝƚƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ
ǁĞƌĞŚĞůĚŝŶĚŽůůĂƌƐĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĞŶƋƵŝƌŝĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůǇƐĠĞWĂůĂĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶŬŽĨ
France was not anxious to give him detailed infoƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽĨĂƌŚĂƐŶŽƚĚŽŶĞƐŽ ? ?74 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĚŽůůĂƌƐ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ
ĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?ĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ŚĞŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŐŽůĚƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ
nevertheless went out of their way to reassure Dillon that they did not wish to undermine 
cooperation.75 
 For his part, Dillon was also more inclined to make concessions to the French, 
including on defense matters and notably on nuclear issues. Throughout 1962, American 
officials tried to encourage their French counterparts to buy more American military goods 
ŽƌƚŽĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ‘ŽĨĨƐĞƚ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂů
Republic of Germany. Costigliola and others have quoted the memorable quip from one 
French officiĂů ? ‘zŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƐĞůůƵƐǁŚĂƚǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽďƵǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
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technology.76 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĂƚĞŵĞƌŐĞƐĨƌŽŵŝůůŽŶ ?ƐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐŝƐŚŽǁĨĂƌŚĞ ?DĐEĂŵĂƌĂ ?
McCone and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor, were willing to 
countenance helping the French, if not on their nuclear program itself, on the associated 
equipment.77 /ŶŽŶĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?DĐEĂŵĂƌĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŽŝůůŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ‘ĂŐƌĞĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚŚŝŵ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚǁŚŽƐĐƵƚƚůĞĚŚŝƐƉůĂŶƐ ?78 
 Transatlantic exchanges between economic authorities during this period provide 
another insight ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƚŝŵŝŶŐŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽŶƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝn the 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞŝůůŽŶĂŶĚ'ŝƐĐĂƌĚ ?ƐďĞƐƚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůŶŽĚƐƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĂƚlantic cooperation most notably in his January 1963 
State of the Union address, the Kennedy administration became concerned about de 
'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĂŶƚŝ-American positions. Dillon assured Kennedy that de Gaulle would not risk 
 ‘ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨŝŶternational cooperation in the monetary, financial and 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐƉŚĞƌĞƐ ? ?ďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐƚŽůĚƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂƉůĂŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ? ?79
Still, and amid calls from the Foreign Ministry to take a tougher stand on the dollar, Giscard 
brokered comprŽŵŝƐĞƐǁŝƚŚŚŝƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ŝŶƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŐďǇƉƵƐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ
prepayments on US loans. 
 Even as French pressure ratcheted up, the cooperative channels between Treasury 
departments continued to make a difference. In part, this was because the US dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛ
position overlapped with the French one on core issues including the type of action that 
might be needed to tackle the balance of payments and the excessive role of US capital on 
European economies. Returning from Europe in December 1961, Roosa applauded the 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉĞůůŝŶŐŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƌĞŐĂŝŶďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨ
ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ? ?80 With a sympathetic President under Kennedy, Dillon led a Cabinet 
Committee charged with tacking the deficit and leveraged the White ,ŽƵƐĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?/Ŷ
March 1963, Kennedy asked the committee if the country was doing enough to convince 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚŽŚŽůĚƚŚĞŝƌĚŽůůĂƌƐ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚůĞǀĞů
 ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ?ďĞǇŽŶĚƚǁŽǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?ŝƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ? ?81 In particular, Dillon echoed 
'ŝƐĐĂƌĚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŵŝŐŚƚĞǆƉŽƌƚŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶŝĨŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚŬĞĞƉŝƚƐďƵĚŐĞƚ
under control.82 
A further concern for France was the inflow of American capital, which began to take 
on nationalist undertones. Whereas the French had courted American capital in earlier 
years, by 1963 they were running a trade surplus and began to express concern about the 
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economic dominance it represented. The issue took on a symbolic importance in the second 
half of the decade, with the publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-^ĐŚƌĞŝďĞƌ ?ƐLe Défi 
Américain that decried American capitalism as a form of colonization and with de Gaulle 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ĞǆƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐŚŝƐ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ƉƌĞƐƐ
conference. However, in the Kennedy administration, the concern over capital flows was 
especially pronounced on the US side as they represented a further dollar drain. The 
Chrysler takeover of the French automobile company Simca later became a lightning rod for 
French opposition to American capital but in 1963, it was Kennedy that used it as an 
example of the type of foreign operations that could also harm the United ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
standing.83 The administration pressed Europeans to develop their own capital markets and, 
when that failed, passed the IET which essentially taxed international transactions. 
With the IET and other concrete policies, including on trade, that addressed the 
balance of payments problem, the Kennedy administration attempted to placate French 
concerns. In June 1963, after a phone conversation with Giscard, Dillon noted that he 
 ‘ĐůŽƐĞĚďǇƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉůĞĂƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚƌĞŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?84 Well into 
1964, as the steps initiated in the Kennedy administration began to take effect, the 
Europeans seemed on board. In May 1964, Dillon found European central and commercial 
ďĂŶŬĞƌƐ ‘ŵƵĐŚŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ĞǀĞŶĂƐƚŚĞǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚĂ ‘ƌĞůĂƉƐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ
ĨŽƌƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? ?85 ZŽŽƐĂƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĞĚŚŝƐ/D&ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶĞǀĞƌ
ĂŐĂŝŶ ?ǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ďĞƐůŽǁƚŽƌĞĂůŝǌĞƚŚĞpayments problems as in 1958- ? ? ? ?86  
tŚĞƌĞĂƐZŽŽƐĂ ?Ɛ comment might have been true under Kennedy, under Johnson the 
mood began to change. American commitments grew at home and abroad but Johnson 
failed to increase taxes and thus  ‘permitted ? serious inflation, as the Treasury warned him 
he would.87 Similarly, when the Treasury suggested that Johnson make a clear statement 
that he would not devalue, as Kennedy had done in the face of a similar recommendation, 
Johnson demurred.88 The new President refused to confront the broader economic 
implications of his choices. Even his expanded assistance towards Europeans themselves, 
with his promise to keep six divisions in Germany, was not vetted for its economic impact. In 
a tersely-worded letter, Dillon fumed that he had learned about the new policy towards 
Germany in the pages of the New York Times and informed the President that it went  ‘a step 
further than President Kennedy ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ. ? Faced with a President who placed 
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a primacy on political messaging, Dillon wrote,  ‘While I full understand and recognize the 
need for a firm position vis-à-vis European public opinion, it is a hard fact that it would be 
most difficult, and probably impossible, for us to maintain our six divisions in Germany if it 
were not for the fact that Germany is currently fully offsetting the balance of payments 
costs of these divisions. ?89 Ultimately, the new President was less willing to listen to, and 
adapt to, the views of his economic advisors in the Treasury, let alone foreign economic 
advisors. 
In this new reality, by 1966, without assurances of fiscal discipline nor the prospect 
ŽĨďƵĚŐĞƚĂƌǇďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇĐŽŶĨĞƐƐĞĚ ? ‘We must wait for the collapse of the 
dollar. ?WŽŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƌĞĂƐwhere Dillon also recommended budget cuts, de Gaulle 
ĂĚĚĞĚ ? ‘The Americans spend too much on Vietnam, research, and space for their own 
good. We shall be forced to cover the American deficit. They will take up a collection and 
our partners will give in to AmericaŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?90 dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁĂǇŽĨŬŶŽǁŝŶŐŝĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
policies would have been enough to continue to secure French cooperation nor even if 
Kennedy would have, or indeed could have, continued to be as fiscally conservative as he 
had been. Nevertheless, behind the façade of continuity in the transition from the Kennedy 
to Johnson administrations and, as de Gaulle discerned, a shift occurred. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Business and the administration 
The Kennedy administration was ultimately more concerned with the business world, and 
ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶtĂůů^ƚƌĞĞƚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĂŶŝƚǁĂƐǁŝƚŚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
ǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƉŽŝŶƚ ? ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ǁĂƐůĞƐƐŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŚĂĚŵŽƌĞŽĨĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
incentive to provoke a run on the dollar. In some respects, the early 1960s were a coming of 
age moment for Wall Street as capital flows became increasingly internationalized and fluid. 
Bankers such as David Rockefeller at Chase Manhattan Bank became true global bankers: in 
the absence of alternative sources of capital abroad, they built up a strong presence around 
the world and especially in Europe.91 Ǉ ? ? ? ? ?ĐůŽƐĞƚŽĂƋƵĂƌƚĞƌŽĨŚĂƐĞ ?ƐƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽǁĂƐ
abroad. In keeping with its global reach, Chase Manhattan created an International Advisory 
Committee that would eventually gather some of the foremost public figures of the time, 
including Dillon, Baumgartner and future Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.92 However, most 
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of these overseas operations also represented a drain on the balance of payments and one 
that seemed less amenable to a diplomatic solution.  
In 1960 and for much of the Kennedy administration, a general climate of distrust 
poisoned relations between business and the administration. Reiterating similar warnings 
from Roosa and Galbraith, Dillon wrotĞƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐŐĞƐƚĚĂŶŐĞƌŝƐŶŽƚĨƌŽŵ
ĂďƌŽĂĚ ?ƚŚĞďŝŐĚĂŶŐĞƌŝƐƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ?ǁŚŽŵŝŐŚƚƉƌŽǀ ŬĞĂƌƵŶŽŶƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌ ?93 American 
businessmen were also more explicit in essentially blackmailing the administration and tying 
their cooperation to a quid pro quo on fiscal discipline. Much as Galbraith dismissed the 
ďĂŶŬĞƌƐĂƐ ‘ŽŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ ?ĞŐŽƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƐƚƵĐŬŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞŝƌĂůǁĂǇƐŵǇŽƉŝĐ
ĂŶĚŽĨƚĞŶŵĞĚŝĞǀĂůŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚƐ ? ?ƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐǁŽƌŬĞĚƚŽƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĞƚŚĞŵ ?94 
 The administration started afoul with the business world. In part, it was a question of 
ĨŽƌŵ PǁŚĞƌĞĂƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐŚĂĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ?A?ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵĞŶ ?
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŽŶůǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƐŝǆ ?95 /ŶůŝĞƵŽĨŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĂďŝŶĞƚŽĨ ‘ĞŝŐŚƚŵŝůůŝŽŶĂŝƌĞƐĂŶĚĂ
plumďĞƌ ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǁĂƐĨŝůůĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƐƚŽĂƐƚŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƐ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĨĞĂƌƐďĞŐĂŶ
to translate into economic outcomes. In April 1962, tensions flared when the steel industry 
broke with official price guidelines aimed at stemming inflation, and in May of the same 
year, ĂƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚĐƌĂƐŚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌĂďĂůĂŶĐĞĚďƵĚŐĞƚ ? 
ŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐďůĂŵĞĚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƚŽĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƐĨĂůů ?ĂŶŬĞƌƐďůĂŵĞĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
anti-ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƐƚƌĞĂŬ ?ƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚƚŚĞďĂŶŬĞƌƐ ?ŝůů-will towards the 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?zĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ ?ŝůůŽŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĨĂŝƌůǇďǇ
ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďŝŐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?96 In June 1962, speaking to the 
Financial Writers Association, Dillon struck a tone that spoke to his previous incarnation as a 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĞƌ ?dŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚďĞĐĂŵĞĂƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞĨŽƌĂůůŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌ
ĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĨŽƌ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐzĂůĞŽŵŵĞŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? ‘WĂŶŝĐƚŽŽŬĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚ
Ez^ ? ?ŝůůŽŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ-  ‘ƚŚĞŵŝƌĂŐĞŽĨŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶ ? W overtook 
ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?,ĞĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ?ƚŚĂƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞĐƌĂƐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨĂŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?,ĞŶŽƚĞĚ ? ‘ŶŽƚŚĞƌŵǇƚŚƚŚĂƚ
has been current in business circles in recent months is the misconception that the Kennedy 
administration is pursuing an overall anti-ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?97 /ƚďĞĐĂŵĞŝůůŽŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞƚŽ
correct this misconception. 
 Writing during the steel crisis, a former partner at Dillon, Read & Co. wrote to Dillon 
ĂƐŬŝŶŐŚŝŵƚŽ ‘ĚŽǇŽƵƌďĞƐƚ ?ƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞŽĨĂĨŝŐŚƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
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and  “business ? ? ?98 This was an uphill battle: one poll suggested that fifty-two percent of 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵĞŶĨĞůƚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂŶƚŝ-business ? ?ƚŚŝƌƚǇ-six percent 
 ‘ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞůǇ ?ƐŽ ?ĂŶĚŽŶůǇŶŝŶĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĨĞůƚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĞŝƚŚĞƌŶĞƵƚƌĂůŽƌƉƌŽ-
business.99 In the face of these alarming poll numbers, Dillon sent Kennedy a study prepared 
ĂƚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞ
ǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞ “ǁŝůĚ-ĞǇĞĚŵĞŶ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?Śŝŵ ?100 Early 
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶďĂĐŬĨŝƌĞĚ ?/ŶŚŝƐũŽƵƌŶĂůƐ ?^ĐŚůĞƐŝŶŐĞƌĂŶŐƌŝůǇŶŽƚĞĚ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞ
are about ten thousand people in the country involved in this  W bankers, industrialists, 
lawyers, publishers, politicians  W a small group but doing everything they can to say that we 
ĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂĚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŚĂƐŶŽĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?101  
As Schlesinger noted, the financial press toed the business line as well. Instead of 
Dillon, Time Magazine put the Chairman of the CEA and the quintessential New Frontier 
intellectual, Walter Heller on its front page with an ominous chart of a collapsing market as 
a backdrop.102 The Wall Street Journal, in particular, was biting in its criticism of the 
administration and became a mouthpiece for conservative criticism. Its op-eds were 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨĂƚĂǆĐƵƚ ?KŶĞƌĞĂĚ P ‘Tax cutting is not at all the surest and 
ƐŽƵŶĚĞƐƚǁĂǇƚŽĂďĂůĂŶĐĞĚďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĂǇŝƐƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? Q ?dŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ
ƚĂǆƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĂǇďĞĨŝŶĞďǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ŚŽŶĞƐƚůǇďĞĐĂůůĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ? ?103 Dillon, who forwarded pertinent media reporting to the 
President, appended one favourable Wall Street Journal ĂƌƚŝĐůĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƌĞĂĚ ? ‘Dƌ ?
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?dŽďĞĨƌĂŵĞĚĨŽƌƉŽƐƚĞƌŝƚǇ ?/ƚŵĂǇŶĞǀĞƌŚĂƉƉĞŶĂŐĂŝŶ ? ?104 
In the face of this resistance, Kennedy centralized control over the administratioŶ ?Ɛ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞĂŶĚƐĞŶƚŝůůŽŶŽŶĂƉĞĂĐĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽ ‘ĐŽƵůĚƚĂůŬ
ĂƐĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵĂŶ ? ?105 ,ĞŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? ‘/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚĂŶǇŽŶĞƚŽƐĂǇ ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĞǆĐĞƉƚĨŽƌŽƵŐŝůůŽŶĂŶĚŵǇƐĞůĨ ? ?106 ƐƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
envoy to the business world, Dillon got to work reaching out to friends including Thomas 
Watson Jr. at IBM and the former Secretary of Defense and banker Robert Lovett, who had 
initially been offered the Treasury job. He resuscitated the Business Advisory Committee 
ǁŚŽƐĞ ‘ůƵŶĐŚĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐƐ ? ?ŚĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŽZŽďĞƌƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ǁĞŶƚƐŽŵĞǁĂǇ
ƚŽďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƵƉĂ ‘ƌĞƐĞƌǀŽŝƌŽĨŐŽŽĚǁŝůůĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ. ?107 
ŝůůŽŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂƐĞŶǀŽǇǁĂƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚĂǆƌeduction and 
tŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŬĞǇĂůůǇĨƌŽŵtĂůů^ƚƌĞĞƚŽŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞǁĂƐĂǀŝĚZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌ ?ŝůůŽŶ
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influenced the public relations aspects of the tax cut and also its timing. Significantly, the 
first tax cut that passed during the Kennedy administration was a change to depreciation 
rules, which essentially allowed businesses to lower their operating costs. The broader 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŽĨŝŶĐŽŵĞƚĂǆƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĚĞůĂǇĞĚŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?108 By 
1962, Dillon agreed with Galbraith and others that a tax cut was good policy and could give 
the economy precisely the kind of boost that it needed. However, he had also won over the 
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĂŶĚ'ĂůďƌĂŝƚŚƚŽŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ?Ɛ ‘ŵŽƌĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŚĞůĚ
off at least until after the mid-ƚĞƌŵĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ŶŽƚĨƌŝŐŚƚĞŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
groups. ?109 
In January 1963, Kennedy and Dillon launched a charm offensive aimed at reassuring 
European and domestic audiences about the tax cut. In his State of the Union address, 
Kennedy emphasized the strength of transatlantic cooperation on monetary issues and 
explained how the tax cut was a necessary step to kick-start the domestic economy in order 
to reduce the budget deficit. He reiterated his underlying objective of attaining budgetary 
balance once the economy was performing as it should. To the IMF, Dillon repeatedly 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐŽĨ ?ƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽďĂůĂŶĐĞƚŚĞďƵĚŐĞƚĂƐƐŽŽŶ
ĂƐĨĞĂƐŝďůĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞůŝŶĞ ‘ƐŽŵĞŽĨŽƵƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉƌĞƐƐĂŶĚďĂŶŬŝŶŐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŚĂǀe 
ďĞĞŶƉĞĚĚůŝŶŐ ? ?110 
 Throughout 1963, Dillon and Kennedy took a more pedagogical approach in order to 
sell the tax cut and its underlying economic principles. Speaking to the American Bankers 
^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵŽŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ'ƌŽǁƚŚŝŶ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ‘ŚŽƉĞ ?Ě ?ƚhat all groups would 
ƉƵƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĨŝƌƐƚ ?ĂƐŚĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƚĂǆĐƵƚĐŽƵůĚďĞďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůĨŽƌ ‘ĨŝƐĐĂů
responsibility, equity and efficiency  W but above all, [would be] in the interest of economic 
ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?ƐďĂŶŬĞƌƐ ?ŚĞƚŽůĚƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŵŽƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚ
ĚĞďƚ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ‘ĨŽƌŐĂŝŶĨƵůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?111 Nonetheless, the President repeated 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŚĂŶŐƐŽŶƵƐ ?ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŚĂŶŐƐƵƉŽŶŽƵƌŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŽƵƌĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? Q ?ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ? ?112 
As he did with the French, Dillon encouraged the view that the administration was 
fiscally conservative in order to stave off a possible attack on the dollar and in order to 
ĐŽŽƉƚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƉĞŽƉůĞĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĐŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐůŝŶĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞŝƌƐpeeches, 
ŚĞĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽ ‘ƉůĂĐĂƚĞĨĞĂƌƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?113 Dillon reassured audiences that the deficits were only for a  ‘ďƌŝĞĨƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů
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ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŚĂƐĞŵƉŚĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?ƚŽ ‘ĂĐourse of intensive 
ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?114 He emphasized that civilian expenditures had largely been limited 
to defense and space, the type of spending they might be more inclined to support. 
 As part of its public relations efforts, the administration also set up a Business 
Committee for Tax Reduction. The committee included major business figures most notably 
its Chairmen Henry Ford II, the railway scion Stuart Saunders and its Vice-Chairman David 
ZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌ ?ZĞĐŽŐŶŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚĂǆĐƌĞĚŝƚŚĂƐĂůůƚŚĞƐĞǆĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨĂ ? ? ?ůď ?ŐƌĂŶĚŵŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ƚŚĞ
administration used these men to advance their message to others in the business world 
and in the key congressional committees, including the Senate Finance Committee and the 
House Ways and Means Committee.115 
In some respĞĐƚƐ ?ZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŽĨĂůů ?ŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ
long-standing relationship with the Rockefeller brothers had continued in his time in 
government. During the Eisenhower administration, John D. Rockefeller had corresponded 
with Dillon about creating public-private partnerships to address international development 
needs.116 In the Kennedy administration, David Rockefeller had expressed a similar interest 
with respect to Latin America. He ultimately became a ĨůĂŐďĞĂƌĞƌĨŽƌŝůůŽŶ ?ƐďƌŝĚŐe-building 
efforts on tax as well as the balance of payments. To be fair, he was predisposed to this role 
before Dillon came calling. He was an internationalist and intellectual businessman who 
championed ideas about responsible business. In a speech, he eǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ
foremost tasks we shall face in the future is the building of sufficiently competent, broad-
ŐĂƵŐĞĚĂŶĚŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ĨĞĞůĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŚŝĐŚŐŽĞƐ
beyond the maximizing of profits for their shĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ?117 ůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?ŚĞǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘the 
businessman still must learn to communicate more effectively with several groups, 
ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵŚŝƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐŝŶůĂďŽƌĂŶĚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?118  
He was able to put his ideas to practice during the Kennedy administration. At a 
ĚŝŶŶĞƌŚĞůĚŝŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚƵůƚƵƌĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŶĚƌĠDĂůƌĂƵǆ ?ƐŚŽŶŽƌ ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĂƐŬĞĚ
ZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌĨŽƌŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?tŝƚŚŝŶǁĞĞŬƐ ?ZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌ
obliged with his insight, including the point that the United ^ƚĂƚĞƐĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ‘ŚĂǀĞŽƵƌĐĂŬĞ
and eat it too  W that taxes can be reduced even while the government expenditures 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ? ?,ĞĂĚĚĞĚ ? ‘ďĂŶŬĞƌƐŚĞƌĞĂŶĚĂďƌŽĂĚůŽŽŬǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŽŶƌĞĐĞŶƚĨŝƐĐĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶ
our country and worry actively about the future of ƚŚĞĚŽůůĂƌ ?ĞǀĞŶǁŚŝůĞŚĞĂƉƉůĂƵĚĞĚƚŚĞ
dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ‘ĨŽƌƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŚĞĂĚ ? ?119  
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About three weeks later, in a letter drafted by Dillon, Kennedy replied. On the 
balance of payments problems, Kennedy ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ P ‘ǁĞŬŶŽǁ
we cannot solves this problem alone  W and other free nations know that they, too, cannot 
afford any weakness in the dollar, which is the very foundation of the international 
ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?120 In a nod to the more conservative sub-ƚĞǆƚŽĨZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ŚĞ
pressed thĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂƚĂǆĐƵƚǁŚŝůĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚƚŚĞ
need for strict control of budget expenditures  W and I have found it desirable to trim the 
budget request of various departments and agents by several billion dollars each year ? ?121 In 
other words, Kennedy was not the fiscally irresponsible bogeyman that bankers imagined. 
 Although the exchange was initially private, Dillon saw in it an opportunity to 
showcase constructive dialogue between the administration and business. In a phone 
conversation with Dillon, the newspaper magnate Henry Luce agreed and suggested that 
publishing the letters in Life Magazine ǁŽƵůĚ ‘ĚĂŵƉĞŶĚŽǁŶƚŚŝƐŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
ŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ŝůůŽŶenthused ? ‘dŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĂƚƐŽŐŽŽĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌĨƌŽŵZŽĐŬĞĨĞller. It is 
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?122 Dillon repeated this language to Rockefeller when he sought his approval, 
ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶ ‘ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƵĨĨ ? ?123 Publishing the letters 
encouraged the view that successful businessmen could be supportive of the administration 
ĂŶĚƉƵƚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞĨŝƐĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƉĂƉĞƌĂƐ
administration policy. 
 The published exchange was widely-praised and both Dillon and Rockefeller received 
a stream of congratulatory letters. Rockefeller continued to help the administration well 
into the fall of 1963 as the battle over the tax cut bill was held up by Senator Harry Byrd in 
the Senate Finance Committee. At the behest of Henry Ford, Rockefeller forwarded a 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚƚŽŚŝƐŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĂŶĚƉƌƵĚĞŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨ
ĨĞĚĞƌĂůĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĂǆĐƵƚ ?124  
Nevertheless, as the administration started to look forward to the 1964 election, 
Galbraith and others reignited fears about a politically-motivated run on the dollar. 
'ĂůďƌĂŝƚŚǁĂƌŶĞĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐĂŶĚďĂŶŬĞƌƐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞŵĐǇŶŝĐĂůƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƌŝĞƐ ? ?,ĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŚŝghly plausible chance of deliberate 
withdrawals by this group at the behest of American conservatives in order to embarrass 
ƚŚĞĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂŶĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶǇĞĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌƐ ?'ŽůĚǁĂƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ
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ǁŽƵůĚ ‘ƌĞůĂƚĞƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?'ĂůďƌĂŝƚŚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐ
Dillon encouraged for bankers and Europeans, was not enough. He maintained that the 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚĂůƐŽĂƚƚĂĐŬǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ‘ĐǇŶŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ-motivated 
 ‘ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ? ?125 Dillon responded ƚŚĂƚ'ĂůďƌĂŝƚŚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌǁĂƐ ‘ĂŶĂŵĂǌŝŶŐŵŝǆƚƵƌĞŽĨƚƌƵƚŚ
ĂŶĚĨĂŶƚĂƐǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĚŝƐĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞŚĞǁĂƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶƐ
might make the balance of payments an electoral issue, existing measures (including 
confidence-building steps) were the best antidote.126 
 tŚĞƌĞĂƐŝŶƚŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝůůŽŶǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐ'ĂůďƌĂŝƚŚ ?Ɛ
fears, he changed his tune in the Johnson administration and began to play up the threat 
that Republicans might seek to embarrass the President in an election year.127 By March 
1964, confronted with a President who was uninterested in the economic issues at hand, 
Dillon encouraged Johnson to meet with the business groups that Kennedy and he had 
created. This might, he suggested, provide an  ‘indication ? to the business community  ‘of 
your personal interest in balance of payments ? issues while exposing Johnson to their 
concerns as well.128 If he could no longer get the tŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ?Ɛ attention, perhaps they 
might. Facing a President and entourage who instead seemed to scorn bankers, Dillon 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚĂǀŝĚZŽĐŬĞĨĞůůĞƌĂŶĚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĞĚĂĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĂƌƚŝĐůĞƚŽ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶĂĚĚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚŝƐ
ƉŽƌƚƌĂǇƐƚŚĞŵĂŶĂƐ/ŬŶŽǁŚŝŵ ? ?129 Observers rightly celebrated Johnson for passing 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚĂǆĐƵƚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨŽƌŚŝƐĚĞĨƚŶĞƐƐ in dealing with Congress. For a time, he 
also reaped the benefits of the steps undertaken to alleviate the balance of payments deficit 
and to placate fears among dollar holders.  
However, the irony, as Dillon sensed, was that Johnson was, in fact, the embodiment 
of the fears that they had expressed about Kennedy, in particular about his lack of fiscal 
discipline. <ĞŶŶĞĚǇŚĂĚǁĞůĐŽŵĞĚŝůůŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞcontacts with 
the business world. By contrast, Johnson ƐĂǁŝůůŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌƚŚĂƐĂZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǁŚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ
political cover  W suggesting him as Ambassador to South Vietnam as the conflict heated up  W 
but disparaged his views and efforts behind his back.130 Communication channels between 
the White House and the business world thus began to break down as did pressure these 
groups had thus far exerted in constraining policy choices. Indeed, as he launched his Great 
Society programs, Johnson boasted of his ability to ignore ŝůůŽŶĂŶĚZŽŽƐĂ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚ




of the Bretton-tŽŽĚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƵŶƌĂǀĞůůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ďĂƌŐĂŝŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ
postwar economic cooperation. Part of the explanation for the collapse of economic 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇůŝĞƐŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĐĂƵƐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
domestic policies and his war spending provoked inflationary pressures. At the same time, 
as others have noted, collaƉƐĞǁĂƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŶŽƚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽƌĂůƐƵĂƐŝŽŶ ?ŵĂƚƚĞƌĚ ?132 
The economic problems during the Johnson administration were also important in so far as 
they signaled a changed economic perspective at the top of the executive. Thinking 
counterfactually, perhaps a President that was more interested in economics, and 
specifically in more conservative economic views such as those espoused by Dillon, might 
have made different choices. Also, if the President had continued to maintain more fiscal 
discipline, perhaps he could have continued to secure cooperation from the same actors 
that eventually attacked the Bretton-Woods system.  
The article contributes to understanding why cooperation from the private sector 
and France was possible in earlier years. It informs ŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŝůůŽŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĂů
place during the Kennedy administration when he played a preeminent role internally as 
well as externally since he was welcomed in groups that subsequently proved to be 
antagonistic.  He was able to draw on friendships in the French Finance Ministry and in the 
business world to great effect. He conveyed an image of bipartisanship that protected 
Kennedy and he shaped the administratiŽŶ ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŵŽƌĞĨŝƐĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ
position that placated fears among dollar holders, thus giving the administration breathing 
room in which to explore reform of the international monetary system. Finally, he had 
privileged access to Kennedy and trumped many of his colleagues, notably in the State 
Department and the CEA, in determining economic policies. 
All this changed under Johnson who was less inclined to listen to Dillon or to 
consider economic views that conflicted with his New Deal ambitions. However, ŝůůŽŶ ?Ɛ
impatience with Johnson was shared in France and also explains de Gaulle ?ƐĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞ
ĚŽůůĂƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ? Ultimately, in the Kennedy administration, Dillon represented a physical and 
intellectual bridge between the administration and problematic groups. Frustrating 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝďĞƌĂůĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ?ŝůůŽŶensured that ƚŚĞƐĞŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? views were represented within 




Figure 1: President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, 1 May 
1961. Credit: Abbie Row, White House Photographs, JFKL. https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-AR6549-B.aspx 
 
Figure 2: President John F. Kennedy addresses American Bankers Association Symposium on 
Economic Growth with David Rockefeller to his left, 25 Feb. 1963. Credit: Abbie Rowe, 
White House Photographs, JFKL. https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-AR7734-I.aspx 
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